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Abstract 
This paper looks at the justification for judicial review and asses
ses its 
recent application in three New Zealand decisions . These de
cisions 
involved applications for the judicial review of bodies which fall o
utside 
those traditionally considered to be reviewable under the ultra v
ires 
rule , including a body exercising prerogative power, a state-
owned 
enterprise and a private agency. The place of the ultra vires rul
e is 
considered and it is argued that judicial review has moved beyo
nd this 
doctrine in such a way that the nature of the power, rather the 
source 
of the power, is now the factor which determines reviewability
. The 
different standards of review being applied by the cour
ts are 
considered, and the potential for judicial review actions based 
on the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is addressed. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnote
s and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 13,530 words. 
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I Introduction 
There are a number of controls on the exercise of public power in New 
Zealand today. These include the ombudsmen, auditors, the official 
information, privacy and human rights legislation and of course, direct 
political control. However, the focus of this paper is judicial review, 
which remains an important means by which to check the use of 
power. 
The majority of judicial review cases involve the review of decisions 
which are sourced directly from government power. Increasingly 
however, plaintiffs are asking that other types of decisions be 
reviewed. One reason for this is that the government has divested 
much of its power. The line between public and private bodies has 
been blurred by the introduction of hybrid "public-private" bodies such 
as stated-owned enterprises. 1 In addition, since the Council of Civil 
Service Unions2 decision which allowed judicial review of a prerogative 
power for the first time, there has been a move toward making 
decisions based on the nature of the power used or abused, rather 
than the source of the power. This approach has had the effect of 
opening up the scope for judicial review. 
Part II of this paper looks at the justification for judicial review. A 
number of topics are covered within this part, including consideration 
of: the traditional basis for judicial review - the ultra vires rule; the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 ; the academic debate about the 
basis of judicial review; the place of the Rule of Law; and the need for 
principled decision-making. 
Parts III , IV and V assess the merits of cases which have allowed, at 
least in principle, judicial review of non-traditional bodies. By "non-
traditional bodies" I mean bodies which exercise powers that are not 
directly sourced from government. In particular, three New Zealand 
decisions are studied in detail. These are : 
2 
Hereafter "SOEs". 
Council of Service Unions v Minister f or the Civil Se rvice [1 984] 3 All ER 680; 
[1 985] AC 374; [1984] 3 WLR 1174 (HL) [CCSU] . 
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(a) Butler v Attorney-General and Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority3 in which a body exercising the prerogative 
power was judicially reviewed; 
(b) Mercury Energy v Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand4, in which a state-owned enterprise - a 
"public-private" body - was found, in principle, to be 
amenable to judicial review; and 
(c) Electoral Commission v Camerons in which a private 
body was judicially reviewed. 
These cases were chosen for several reasons. First, they cover a range 
of types of bodies which have been traditionally been subject to 
judicial review. Second, they are relatively recent, thereby giving an 
indication of the Courts' current approach and thinking. Third, they 
are New Zealand decisions: this paper focuses on the status of judicial 
review in New Zealand. 
The rationale for these decisions is looked at, and I ask whether the 
broadening of the range of bodies subject to judicial review is causing 
the grounds of review to be watered down. In particular, the courts 
appear to be applying different standards depending on the type of 
body or the act performed by that body. This is seen most clearly in 
Mercury and Cameron. On this basis, it seems that, despite the fact 
that a body is more likely to be found to be reviewable in principle, a 
successful review is likely to be achieved in fewer cases. I aim to look 
at reasons why this is happening, its effect, and some alternative 
options. 
II JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The traditional defence of judicial review of administrative action rests 
on the ultra vires doctrine . Judges must ensure that public officials do 
3 Unreported, Keith J, Court of Appeal, CA181/97, 13/ 10/97 [Butler] . 
4 [1994] 2 NZLR 385 [Mercury]. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNtVERSI fY OF WELLINGTON 
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not stray beyond the legal limits of their statutory authority. In recent 
years there has been some academic debate about the place of the 
ultra vires rule in today's judicial review actions. This debate is 
discussed below. 
It is argued that the basis of judicial review now firmly lies with the 
nature of the power exercised rather than its source. When assessing 
whether or not a decision should be reviewable, the judiciary must 
look at whether or not a public function was exercised by the decision-
maker. Another factor to consider is whether or not there is an 
alternative form of redress. Administrative law's purpose should be to 
provide a remedy for abuse of public power. At the very least, the 
availability of judicial review should provide a check on the exercise of 
public power. In each situation the facts must be considered and an 
assessment made about whether or not the decision is one which 
should be open to review. 
This Part begins by defining the scope of judicial review and looking at 
the place of the Judicature Amendment Act. Following this is a 
discussion of some of the academic debate centering on the basis of 
judicial review, and a consideration of the place of the Rule of Law. 
The final section looks at the need for principled decision-making. 
A Defining the scope of Judicial Review 
The ultra vires rule, stated briefly, is as follows: 6 A public body that 
has been granted powers, whether by statutes, Orders in Council or 
some other instrument, must not exceed the powers so granted. A 
body will have exceeded its powers if either: 
5 
6 
[1997] 2 NZLR 421 [Cameron]. 
This definition is taken from Olive r "Is the Ultra Vires rule the basis of 
judicial review" [1987] PL 542, 544. Oliver's article is discussed below. 
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(a) it has done, or decided to do, an act that it does not 
have the legal capacity to do. In other words it has 
exceeded its powers in the narrow7, or strict8 sense; or 
(b) in the course of doing or deciding to do something 
that is intra vires in the strict or narrow sense, it acts 
improperly or "unreasonably" in various ways. These 
ways include: disregard of the rules of natural justice; 
unfairness; taking into account irrelevant 
considerations or ignoring relevant considerations; 
bad faith; fettering discretion and so on. 
The first limb of the rule stems from Dicey's Rule of Law.9 The second 
limb has its root in the Wednesbury Corporation10 case and Ridge v 
Baldwin11 , and rests on the interpretation of the instrument granting 
the power. Parliament, or the "donor" of the power, is presumed not to 
have intended that the authority should act in breach of the principles 
of good administration. 
In New Zealand, as elsewhere, numerous authorities have been 
created and adopted by the state to achieve ends conceived to be for 
the public good. Duties are imposed and powers conferred upon these 
public authorities to enable them to achieve these ends. For example, 
government departments and local authorities are created by or under 
statute, they are endowed with statutory powers and they are funded 
by the public for conferring what are conceived to be benefits upon the 
community, or a section thereof. These authorities easily fit within the 
ultra vires rule. 
7 For the use of this term see Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign 
Compensation Commission [1969) 2 AC 147, 171. 
s For this expression see Mervyn Davies J in Rosemary Simmons Memorial 
Housing Association Ltd v United Dominions Trust [ 1987) 1 All ER 281, 285-
286. 
9 The Rule of Law is discussed below. 
10 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [ 1948) 
1 KB 223 [Wednesbury Corporation). 
11 [1964) AC 40. 
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However, the ultra vires rule does not go far enough today. As will be 
discussed below, a strict interpretation of the rule places too many 
bodies outside the scope of judicial review despite the fact they carry 
out similar functions to those that fit within the rule. When 
determining whether judicial review should be available it is important 
to distinguish between the nature of the body and the nature of the 
act performed by that body. For example, a public body exercising 
public powers is clearly reviewable, but the line becomes less clear 
when that same body exercises private power. Private bodies 
performing private acts are not subject to judicial review, but where 
the act includes an element of public function, judicial review may be 
appropriate. This tension between public and private power has 
become more pronounced in recent years as more public functions are 
carried out by private agencies (often established by government) and 
as the ineffectiveness of the ultra vires rule has been highlighted. 
The judiciary has recognised this and, over time, a function based 
approach to determining the scope of judicial review has become more 
common. The questions asked by the courts in recent judicial review 
actions tend to focus on the nature of the power exercised by the 
decision-maker, rather than the source of the power. For example, in 
R v Panel of Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin12 Lord Diplock, in 
assessing what should be taken into account in deciding whether a 
body is subject to judicial review, said: 13 
The only essential elements are what can be described as a 
public element, which can take many forms , and the exclusion 
from jurisdiction of bodies where the sole source of power is the 
consensual submission to its jurisdiction. 
This statement indicates the approach the United Kingdom courts 
generally take today. In New Zealand however, it does not appear that 
the courts have fully embraced this method in every instance. This is 
discussed in the sections on review of prerogative power and review of 
12 [1987] l QB 815 [Data.fin] . 
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public-private bodies below. In both these areas there has been a 
tendency toward focusing on the source of the power rather than its 
nature. It is argued that this tendency is stopping New Zealand law 
on judicial review from developing in a principled manner. One reason 
for the concentration on sources of power is found within the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
B The Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
New Zealand has a unique feature in its legislation which complicates 
assessing whether or not a body should be amenable to judicial 
review. Judicial review is theoretically available both pursuant to 
common law and under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
However, the existence of this Act has meant that the common law 
action has been largely neglected in recent years.14 Before actions of a 
decision-maker can be reviewed under the Act there must have been 
an exercise or a purported exercise of a "statutory power" as defined in 
section 3: 
"Statutory power" - means a power or right conferred by or 
under any Act [or by or under the constitution or other 
instrument of incorporation, rules, or bylaws of any body 
corporate] -
(a) To make any regulation , rule, bylaw, or order, or 
to give any notice or direction having force as 
subordinate legislation; or 
(b) To exercise a statutory power of decision; or 
13 Data.fin above n 12, 838. 
14 Note however that common law review is still used in New Zealand. Rul
e 
626 of the High Court Rules sets out the procedure for bringing an action 
for certiorari and in some situations it is simpler to bring review 
proceedings under this Rule than under the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972. 
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(c) To require any person to do or refrain from doing 
the act or thing that, but for such requirements, 
he would not be required by law to do or refrain 
from doing; or 
(d) To do any act or thing that would, but for such 
power or right, be a breach of the legal right of 
any person; [or 
(e) To make any investigation or enquiry into the 
rights , powers , privileges, immunity, duty, or 
liability of any person.] 
9 
The section 3 requirement that a power or right be conferred by or 
under any Act or under the governing instrument of any body 
corporate has meant that some judges have placed great emphasis on 
the source of power as opposed to its nature. This has influenced 
justiciability issues when the courts have been called upon to review 
decisions, particularly where review of commercial decisions is sought. 
Specifically, the Judicature Amendment Act does not encourage the 
judiciary to look at the nature of a power has been exercised at first 
instance. Rather, the technical requirements of the source of the 
power are concentrated on to begin with. It is submitted that this part 
of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 is no longer adequate and 
further review is necessary.is 
Alternative bases for justifying judicial review are discussed in the 
next sections which cover some of the academic debate surrounding 
judicial review, the place of the Rule of Law, and the need for 
principled decision-making. 
C Academic debate 
In recent years there has been considerable academic debate about 
the basis of judicial review and, in particular, the place of the ultra 
vires rule. A number of writers have considered ways in which judicial 
1s A full review of this Ac t is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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review can be justified. In this section I will consider three articles 
which show different approaches to this issue. I will also consider the 
importance of principled decision making. 
The first article written by Dawn Oliver in 1987 is titled 'Is the ultra 
vi.res rule the basis of judicial review? l6 This article challenges the use 
of the ultra vi.res rule and proposes that the nature of the power 
exercised should be concentrated on, rather than the source of the 
power. Following this I look in some detail at Christopher Forsyth's 
article 'Of fig leaves and fairy tales: the ultra vi.res doctrine, the 
sovereignty of parliament and judicial review'17 which defends the ultra 
vi.res rule. Lastly, I consider David Dyzenhaus' article 'Reuniting the 
Brain: the Democratic Basis of Judicial Review'l8 which was written in 
response to Forsyth's paper. Dyzenhaus is critical of Forsyth's 
approach, and sets out his theory that the problems with the doctrine 
stem from its basis in positivist legal theory: in his view, a theory of 
judicial review must be anti-positivist. 
These articles are by no means the only ones written on the topic, but 
they represent a range of views, and in this respect they complement 
each other. However, before looking at these articles the history of 
judicial review deserves to be considered because the current debate 
about the place of the ultra vi.res rule belies the fact that the rule is a 
modern concept. 
1 lntra vires is a modern concept 
Paul Craig, in his text Administrative Law, looks at the history of 
judicial review and notes that "the courts have, ever since the origiris 
of judicial review, exerted control over the discretion exercised by 
tribunals, agencies and the like, in order to prevent that power from 
being misused or abused."19 This is illustrated by the early decision in 
16 [1987] PL 542 [Oliver]. 
11 [1996] CW 122 [Forsyth]. 
1s To be published in a forthcoming issue of Public Law [Dyzenhaus] . 
19 Paul Craig Administrative Law (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994), 400 
[Administrative Law] . 
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Rooke's Case20 where the Commissioners of Sewers had repaired a 
river bank and charged Rooke for the whole amount despite the fact 
that other landowners had also benefited from the work. The 
Commissioners had a discretion as to the levying of the money, but 
the Court struck their decision down by holding that the discretion 
had to be exercised according to reason and law and it was 
unreasonable for Rooke to bear the whole burden. These 
Commissioners were not exercising delegated powers from parliament 
but were held to be subject to judicial review. Ultra vires has only 
been used relatively recently to determine the scope of review. 
Craig notes that the motivation behind early judicial review was 
twofold, principally the desire to ensure the predominance of the High 
Court over "inferior jurisdictions", and to provide remedies to those 
whom the established judiciary felt had been unjustly or illegally 
treated by such authorities.21 Judicial review was slowly transformed 
in the nineteenth century. The rationale for early judicial review 
continued to exist, but this was supplemented by a growing tendency 
to relate the exercise of judicial power to the will of Parliament. In this 
way, the ultra vires doctrine became the justification for judicial 
intervention. 
This historical account of the development of judicial review shows 
how the cause of action has changed significantly since its beginnings. 
It indicates that ultra vires has never been the sole justification for 
judicial review. On this basis it seems natural that the cause of action 
will continue to develop beyond ultra vires. The rest of this section 
focuses on three articles which proffer different theories about the 
basis of judicial review today. 
20 (1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b. See also, Hetley v Boyer (1614) Cro. Jae. 336; R v 
Askew (1768) 4 Burr. 218 ; and Leader v Moxon {1773) 2 WBl. 924. 
21 Administrative Law above n 19, 6. 
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2 Protection from abuse of power 
In 1987 Dawn Oliver opened the current debate on the place of the 
ultra vires rule in modern judicial review. 22 Her basic theory is that 
judicial review has moved on from the ultra vires rule to a concern for 
the protection of individuals, and/ or the control of power, rather than 
powers, or vires. In Oliver's view, public bodies should be subject to at 
least the same degree of judicial supervision as private bodies. For 
example, private bodies are subject to extensive contractual checks. 
Since the source of a power is irrelevant, property and contracting 
powers may be subject to judicial review. Oliver goes on to give 
examples of instances where courts have been flexible in allowing 
judicial review. 
Oliver uses Galbraith's analysis of the anatomy of power23 to cast light 
on the issues underlying the question of whether, and if so, when, the 
courts should concern themselves with the exercise and abuse of 
power. Galbraith identifies three instruments of power as being 
condign power, compensatory power, and conditioned power. In a 
legal sense, condign power is the use of coercive legislation backed up 
by powers of punishment imposed through the court. Compensatory 
power is the power to win submission by the offer of an affirmative 
reward, usually through the deployment of money or property, but 
also through the grant of licenses and other privileges. Conditioned 
power is the influence that a ruler or other individual or organisation 
derives from public benefit and his or her authority. These 
instruments of power can be distinguished from the sources of power, 
which Galbraith identifies as property, organisation and personality. 
Where one of these instruments of power is being exercised, in theory 
judicial review should be available . If the judiciary begins from this 
premise rather than starting by looking at the source of power, a more 
equitable system of judicial review will be achieved. 
22 Oliver above n 16. 
23 As set out in his book The Anatomy of Power (1983). 
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Oliver's article convincingly argues that the traditional bounds of 
judicial review no longer fit and she has rightly identified power as an 
important factor in identifying instances in which judicial review 
should be available. She concludes that "[o]nce the nature and 
problem of power are recognised, the courts will be in a better position 
to develop a supervisory jurisdiction designed to prevent the abuse of 
power" .24 
3 In defence of the ultra vires rule 
In his article2s, Christopher Forsyth rejects Oliver's thesis and defends 
the ultra vires doctrine. His argument is that ultra vires is a "gentle but 
necessary discipline" against which judges should not "chafe" .26 He 
takes on two common criticisms of the doctrine, namely: 
(a) ultra vires cannot explain the whole of the 
judicial review (especially the extension to 
review of non-statutory bodies); and 
(b) the concept of ultra vires can play no part in 
determining whether non-statutory bodies 
which exercise no legal powers at all are 
subject to judicial review. 
Forsyth argues that the ultra vires doctrine retains its central position 
because the majority of cases still fit within the rule. Courts can 
control the abuse of monopolies by their Common Law power as the 
Common Law draws no distinction between monopoly powers that 
exist by virtue of some government intervention and those that exist 
as a matter of fact. This is true, but it would be more effective if the 
law of judicial review was not separated out into different doctrines in 
24 Oliver above n 16, 569. 
2s Forsyth above n 1 7. 
26 Forsyth above n 17, 137 . 
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an arbitrary way. Basing eligibility for review on the nature of the 
power is a more logical approach. 
In particular, Forsyth is concerned that abandoning the ultra vzres 
doctrine implies the abandonment of legislative supremacy. He argues 
that such a profound change in the constitutional order should not be 
undertaken by the judiciary of their own motion. Certainly Forsyth is 
correct in stating that the judiciary should not make fundamental 
constitutional changes of its own volition. However, it is somewhat 
extreme to argue that changing the basis of judicial review falls into 
this category. As was noted above, the ultra vires rule has not always 
been the basis of judicial review. In fact, it seems likely that it was the 
judiciary who initially developed the doctrine. Given this, it does not 
seem inherently wrong that the judiciary should continue to develop 
judicial review to better fit today's systems of government and power 
structures. 
4 A democratic basis for judicial review? 
Most recently, David Dyzenhaus has argued that the ultra vires rule is 
not sufficient basis for today's judicial review. 27 His article, 'Reuniting 
the Brain: the Democratic Basis of Judicial Review' directly challenges 
Forsyth's theory. He deems Forsyth's defence of the rule incoherent 
and instead offers a value based, democratic approach to justifying 
judicial review. 
Dyzenhaus argues that the ultra vires doctrine is not consistent with 
judicial review where there is no statutory basis for review. Rules of 
manner and form have been too heavily relied upon in the past and in 
order to move beyond this, the intrinsic problems of ultra vires should 
be addressed. These problems stem from the doctrine's basis in 
positivist legal theory: a theory of judicial review must be anti-
positivist. The doctrine relies on an impoverished understanding of 
democracy. A modern theory of judicial review must reunite legal and 
political theory by incorporating democratic values. In Dyzenhaus' 
72224 WGN WGN2098 
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view, this approach will show how the common law and statute are 
best understood as the expressions of fundamental legal values . 
These values aim to provide justice in a democratic way. 
Dyzenhaus' article offers a quite different approach to either Oliver or 
Forsyth. His theory suggests a fundamental change in the way we 
view judicial review, is needed. This shift may be seen over time, and 
no doubt some members of the judiciary will place greater emphasis 
on these types of issues than will others. 
D The rule of law remains central 
As was noted above, the element of the ultra vires rule which states 
that a decision-maker must not do anything beyond its powers stems 
from Dicey's Rule of Law. In its most simple formulation, the Rule of 
Law contains three propositions: certainty, generality and equality. 
The law should be certain so the people are protected from arbitrary 
decision-making. The law should apply to everyone, and the law 
should apply to everyone equally. 
In my view, the ultra vires rule is no longer the basis of judicial review 
but, despite this, the Rule of Law retains its central position. The Rule 
of Law justifies judicial action and gives a framework from which to 
explain the way in which judicial review has developed. It does not 
preclude judicial review developing beyond the ultra vires rule to allow 
the nature of the power to be assessed in determining reviewability. 
In fact , it follows that the Rule of Law encourages such a development 
by its recognition of the concepts of generality and equality in 
particular. 
At least one member of New Zealand's judiciary has directly noted this 
point. Justice Baragwanath, in his recent decision Patel v Cmef 
Executive of the Department of Labour said "the Rule of Law justifies 
the judicial creation of the concept of legitimate expectation which is 
27 Dy zenh a u s a bove n 18 . 
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central to many judicial review actions". 28 In Patel's case the 
appellant, a resident of India who had applied for a residence permit to 
enter New Zealand, sought judicial review of the New Zealand 
Immigration Service's decision not to grant him and his family a 
residency permit. This decision involved an exercise of the prerogative 
so the power did not fall easily within the scope of the ultra vires rule. 
Justice Baragwanath was satisfied that the decision was not made in 
accordance with law and ref erred the matter back to the Residence 
Appeal Authority with directions as to the matters to be considered. 
The following comments were made: 29 
The rule of law requires that a person whose factual situation is 
indistinguishable from another should be given like treatment: 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Wilson (1996) 1 7 NZTC 
12,512. There 1s no justification for applying different 
constructions of a rule which purports to be of general 
application. 
This application of the Rule of Law highlights the need for consistency 
of decision-making. For decisions to be consistent, there must be 
some degree of principle exercised. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
E Principled decision-making: 
watered down? 
Is judicial review being 
It is often said that judicial review is intolerably uncertain and 
amounts to little more than a licence for judges to interfere arbitrarily 
with the machinery of government and administration. As Brennan 
has written: 30 
2s [1997] 1 NZLR 102, 110 [Patel]. 
29 Patel above n 28, 111. 
30 G Brennan. "The purpose and scope of judicial review" in Michael Taggart 
(ed), Judicial Review of Administrative action in the 1980s (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1986) 18. 
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The political legitimacy of judicial review depends, in the ultimate 
analysis, on the assignment to the Courts of that function by the 
general consent of the community . .. judicial review has no 
support other than public confidence. 
17 
Judicial review needs to maintain a degree of public confidence and, 
as such, it should be available in a range of situations. These 
situations should not be limited to the traditional areas, defined by the 
ultra vires rule, in which only decisions made by the government were 
amenable to review. That is too limited a view now. It is a positive 
move to allow judicial review more often as the previous distinctions 
were often arbitrary and are totally unworkable today now that more 
public powers are exercised without being sourced directly from 
government. 
In many instances the Courts have recognised this and have used 
different standards to justify judicial review.3 1 In my view, it is 
necessary to look at the types of bodies which should be reviewable by 
virtue of the nature of the power they exercise. A principled approach 
to this development is required. It is argued that this has been 
lacking in many decisions made in recent times. 
The rest of this section discusses the need for some degree of certainty 
in judicial review and the reasons why actions are brought in judicial 
review. Following this, I consider why the courts are allowing different 
standards of review for different types of actions and the merits of this 
approach. 
1 The need for certainty 
The articulation of reasons 1s an essential element of the judicial 
process. Judges' decisions are expected to apply legal rules to a 
particular, and often complicated, set of facts. If these rules become 
so generalised as to lose real meaning or predictable application it 
31 A selection of these decisions 1s discussed in Parts III, IV and V of this 
paper. 
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becomes necessary to refine them into a useful format. A recent New 
Zealand decision traversed this issue in the area of the law of trusts. 
Justice Fisher found little guidance from stock phrases common to 
this area of law. In the course of his decision he commented that32: 
the fact that at the end of the road there is an unavoidable 
leap into robust assessment does not exempt one from 
traversing a series of principles in order to reach the right 
point from which to launch into space. Nor does it simply 
imply that one's trajectory during flight will be wholly 
uninfluenced by preconceived considerations . No one doubts 
that the facts of each case will be unique, that no single rule 
could hope to govern all cases, that flexibility must be 
preserved, and that the final step will be the exercise of a 
value judgment. But considerations like these - not for the 
first time proffered to justify a judicial carte blanche - have 
never been accepted in the long term for abandoning the 
search for coherence and stability. 
These considerations are equally applicable to the law of judicial 
review. There has been a judicial tendency to decide cases based on 
what "feels right", but it is arguable that this does not help the future 
of the law. Principled decision making is essential in our precedent 
based jurisdiction and without it there is no way to predict how 
decisions will be made in future. Such unpredictability is difficult for 
both the public and the judiciary. 
However, this argument must be tempered by looking at the nature of 
judicial review actions. Administrative law cases tend to be difficult 
cases. 33 Often an issue is brought as a judicial review proceeding 
because it does not fit another cause of action, despite the fact that 
the overall justice of the case indicates that a remedy (or at least a 
32 Bank of New Zealand v NZ Guardian Trust Co Ltd (22 April 1998) 
unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 431/94; Noted in (1998) 21 
TCL 22, 1. 
33 R Cooke 'The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law' in Michael 
Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland 1986) 1, 2 -3 . 
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h earing) is deserved. The very nature of the decisions being reviewed 
tends toward a different style of judgment to that used in many other 
areas of law and each set of facts will be unique. However, the fact 
that the issue is difficult does not mean that the principles applied in 
deciding the cases need be difficult too . 
2 Why Judicial Review? 
The reasons why judicial review is sought can also shed light on the 
way cases are decided. Many judicial review actions seek interim 
orders because an immediate stay of events is required. Often, the 
cases do not end up going to a full hearing. At other times, the way in 
which a case is pleaded can affect the way in which the judiciary 
makes its decision. There can be problems with a paucity of facts , 
especially where an interim order is reconsidered in the Court of 
Appeal.34 It is certainly arguable that more full pleadings should be 
allowed at this point, especially if the case is one which holds potential 
to form new law. Without this, the decision cannot really be 
considered relevant as it is based on a poor interpretation of the facts. 
It seems natural that if more decision-makers are being found to be 
reviewable in principle, more plaintiffs will bring actions in judicial 
review against decisions which adversely affect their interests. 
However, the fact that decision-makers are reviewable in principle, 
does not mean that the decision is found to be wrong in every 
instance. In light of this, the concept of "success" must be considered. 
In some instances a party may never expect to win the case on judicial 
review but the surrounding publicity or the delay caused may be 
deemed enough. A normative view of "success" could be too narrow in 
this area: it is trite that the chances of effecting a judicial review and 
gaining a remedy is slight. In addition, you would think that the costs 
of bringing such actions would be prohibitive. Yet, despite this, many 
actions are brought each year, so it would seem that other agendas 
are working behind the scenes. In some cases people will try every 
34 This problem was illus tra ted in But ler (discu ssed in Pa rt III) where the 
Court did not have the full fac ts b efore it. 
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avenue they can, especially in areas such as immigration where the 
vast majority of judicial review actions are taken against the Crown.35 
Judicial review has, to some extent, always acted more as a 
prophylactic than as a cure as the chances of successfully reviewing a 
decision have never been especially high. However, it is certainly 
arguable that the way the law is moving at present means the chances 
of success are slimmer than ever. More types of bodies are reviewable 
than in the past, but it is increasingly difficult to make out a ground of 
review. 
Arguably, this (lack of) direction opens up potential for abuse of power. 
The bullish advisor could say to the decision maker, "just go ahead, 
make the decision", because the likelihood of being reviewed, and 
subsequently being required to revisit the decision, is so slight. 
However, this idea needs to be tempered with political reality. The 
media, for example, wields enormous power which could be used to 
curb the decision-maker's approach. Few politicians would be 
prepared to run a high risk on this front. In addition, there are other 
controls such as the ombudsmen, the official information, privacy and 
human rights legislation, and the hope that the majority of those 
holding power do intend to use it fairly. 
3 Different standards of review depending on the decision-
maker 
As we have seen, judicial review is available against more decision-
makers, more often than it was historically. Does this mean that more 
plaintiffs gain judgment in their favour on the substantive merits of 
their case? It appears that different standards of review, and 
consequently different chances of success, apply depending on the 
situation or body being review. For example, commercial decisions of 
35 Ministry of Justice A quantitative analysis of judicial review files in New 
Zealand - Jan 1992 - March 1997 (Wellington, 1998) . This report shows that 
of 505 judic ial review files surveyed, 61 % of files were brought by 
immigrants . 
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bodies with some statutory powers (discussed in part IV) appear only 
to be reviewable where there has been "fraud, corruption or bad faith" 
- a very high standard. Conversely, decisions which have a strong 
public element but which are made by non-statutory bodies may be 
more readily found to have acted unreasonably. The Court hinted at 
this in Cameron36 where the "reasonableness" of a decision was 
assessed. 
Classic definitions of unreasonableness set very high standards like: 
"so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come 
to it"37; the decision-maker has "taken leave of his senses"38; or the 
decision elicits exclamations like, "my goodness, that is certainly 
wrong!"39 or, "this is unacceptable"40_ However, this high standard is 
not a universal, across the board standard. The Court generally 
expresses deference to administrative decision-makers, but the exact 
amount of deference necessarily varies depending on the status of the 
decision-making body and, it would appear, the nature of the interest 
at issue. 
In Cameron the Court of Appeal indicated that the application of a 
lower threshold of unreasonableness than the high Wednesbury 
threshold would be appropriate. This is discussed in more detail in 
Part V. Arguably it is appropriate to apply different standards 
depending on the nature of the decision-maker and the decision. 
Such different standards are not unusual in the law. For example, in 
tort law a lower duty of care is sometimes applied where government is 
involved. The rationale behind this seems to be that it would be too 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Cameron above n 5 . 
Wednesbury Corporation above n 10 . 
R v Secretary of Stat.e for the Environment, ex parte Notts CC [1986] 2 AC 
240, 247-248 . 
RvDevonCC, exparteG[1988] 1 WLR49,51. 
Paul Walker "What's Wrong with Irrationality?" [1995] Pubic Law 556, cited 
in New Zealand Fede ration of Commercial Fishermen (Inc) v Minister of 
Fisheries (24 April 1997) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, 
CP 237 /95 . 
72224 WGN WGN2098 
22 
expensive to find the government liable on a regular basis. In judicial 
review, the rationale for such distinctions could be the desire to avoid 
unnecessary intervention where the decision-maker and the person 
affected by the decision have equal power, and the wish to allow 
greater intervention when the decision-maker is wielding a public 
power, the abuse of which could bring about adverse effects. 
F Interim conclusion 
This section has outlined the fact that the traditional justification for 
judicial review has changed. Academic debate has brought about a 
number of theories about the basis of judicial review and its place in 
today's legal system. In assessing the place of judicial review today it 
is important to consider the role the cause of action plays in bringing 
redress for plaintiffs and the reasons why such actions are brought to 
court. Judicial review is available in more situations, and depending 
on the nature of the power exercised by the decision-maker, the 
courts are using different standards to determine the merits of the 
individual cases. 
The following Parts focus on three recent decisions of the New Zealand 
Courts which involved the judicial review of non-traditional bodies. 
They illustrate the need for principled decision making which takes 
into account the realities of the difficulties of judicial review cases, and 
the different ways in which the issues surrounding the availability of 
judicial review can be approached. 
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III REVIEW OF PREROGATIVE POWER: BUTLER v RSAA 
This section considers how the New Zealand Court of Appeal recently 
dealt with an application for judicial review of a body exercising its 
power under the prerogative. Review of the prerogative has, in recent 
years, been one of the least contentious developments in the 
expansion of judicial review. However, the decision in Butler41 has 
cast doubt on the area. At the very least a real opportunity to develop 
some principles in this area was given away. 
This part begins by looking at the way in which review of the 
prerogative has been handled by the courts, both in New Zealand and 
in Britain. Following this, the facts of Butler are noted and the Court 
of Appeal's decision scrutinised. 
A Review of the Prerogative 
Traditionally , the exercise of prerogative power was not judicially 
reviewable because the power is not sourced from statute and, 
therefore, 1t does not fit easily within the ultra vires doctrine . 
Prerogative power is recognised by the common law and is not 
"granted" by any donor whose intentions as to its proper use can be 
implied.42 
However, the issue came under scrutiny m CCSU. 43 In this case, 
Great Britain's Prime Minister indirectly exercised the prerogative and 
issued an instruction under the Civil Service Order in Council. 44 This 
instruction unilaterally revoked the right to trade union membership 
in Britain's security intelligence organisation. There had been a 
practice of prior consultation with the union before changes were 
made to member's conditions of service, and the union sought review 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Butle r a bove n 3 . 
Oliver a b ove n 16, 5 46. 
CCSU a b ove n 2. 
The Order in Council was m ade u nder the prerogative. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VIGTQR' uN1vt:rmrrr o WELLINGTON 
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of the instruction alleging the Minister had breached the duty to act 
fairly. 
It was found that some prerogative powers are subject to judicial 
review in principle. The majority in the House of Lords decided that 
'the controlling factor in determining whether the exercise of 
prerogative power is subject to judicial review is not its source but its 
subject matter. '45 However, in this case the Crown showed that there 
were national security concerns, and their Lordships held that it was 
for the government and not the courts to decide when those concerns 
outweighed those of fairness. 
The CCSU case also established that not all exercises of the 
prerogative are reviewable. This idea has been developed in 
subsequent decisions. In R v The Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Evereft46 Taylor LJ distinguished those 
acts at "the top of the scale of executive functions under the 
prerogative" involving "high policy", which were not justiciable, from 
"administrative decisions affecting the rights of individuals and their 
freedom to travel", which are justiciable. This case involved the power 
to issue passports. 47 
New Zealand finally took the opportunity to endorse this English 
development in 1992 in Burt v Govemor-Genera[4B _ The applicant was 
a convicted murderer who sought judicial review of the Governor-
General's refusal to exercise the prerogative of mercy. The Court of 
Appeal established the reviewability of the prerogative on ordinary 
common law principles but dismissed Burt's application on its merits. 
4 5 CCSU above n 2, 399 (per Lord Scarman). See also Lord Diplock at 409 and
 
Lord Roskill at 417 . 
46 [1989] QB 811. 
47 This is a statutory power in New Zealand and as such the issue of the
 
prerogative would not arise in this situation. However, the principle relating 
to the nature of the prerogative power is the same. 
48 [1992] 3 NZLR 672 . 
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Since Burt was decided, other New Zealand cases have allowed review 
of prerogative power. Some of these decisions have included a 
principled approach to this area of review. For example, in Patel's 
case Justice Baragwanath set out the court's role in reviewing the 
prerogative:49 
Where there is conduct which is irrational or unfair in a way 
inexplicable by criteria of broad policy the Courts will [intervene]. 
It is their function to determine the scope of a decision maker's 
authority even when expressed in the widest terms. 50 Such 
function imports an obligation to state the law, not only the 
meaning of a statute but also the scope of the prerogative, the 
lawfulness of which is to be assessed by settled norms accepted 
in New Zealand including those of the rule of law. Prerogative 
powers should be confined within limits which it is the function 
of the Courts to identify. 
In Butler, however, the Court of Appeal did not identify any such 
functions. As will be seen below, the issue of review of the prerogative 
was not concentrated on in any detail. 
B Facts of Butler 
Danny Butler became a well known figure in New Zealand during the 
1990s as he fought to gain refugee status and remain in the country, 
rather than face deportation to Ireland. Butler claimed he was 
entitled to refugee status under the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees to which New Zealand is a signatory. He 
contended, in terms of the Convention, that owing to well founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of political opinion, he was outside the 
countries of his nationality (Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 
the Republic of Ireland), and that, owing to this fear, he was unable to 
return to those countries. 
Officials of the New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) declined 
Butler's application for refugee status and the Refugee Status Appeals 
49 Pat.el above n 28, 110. 
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Authority (RSAA) dismissed his appeal from that decision. Butler 
sought judicial review of the RSAA's decision and he sought an order 
requiring the RSAA to consider the appeal afresh on a different basis 
from that which it was said to have adopted. 
Robertson J, in the High Court, dismissed the application. Issues of 
law were raised in the Court of Appeal but the five judges hearing the 
case were unanimous in their decision that the RSAA did not err in 
law and the appeal was dismissed. Keith J delivered the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal. 
C The decision 
The decision began with an outline of the issue and the proceedings. 
It was noted that the grounds for the challenge to the RSAA's decision 
as presented to that court were markedly different from those argued 
in the court below. The definition of refugee was set out and following 
this a description of the facts was given. 
Next, the decision of the RSAA was described and the alleged errors of 
law addressed. Only after this was the issue of whether or not the 
RSAA was in fact reviewable considered. This was not a logical way to 
approach the case. In an action for judicial review the reviewabiltiy of 
the body alleged to have exercised its power improperly is a central 
question and as such it should not be relegated to a few paragraphs at 
the end of a judgment. If the availability of review is clear cut, that 
part of the proceeding may be swiftly dealt with, but if there is a real 
issue to consider - as was the case in Butler - this should be 
acknowledged before (for example) the fairness of the way in which the 
power was actually exercised is decided upon. 
When the issue of reviewability was finally addressed, the Court of 
Appeal sat on the fence . It did not express a final view on whether or 
not the decisions of the RSAA are reviewable. Justice Keit h stated 
so See Padfield v Ministe r of Agriculture Fisheries and Food [ 1968] AC 997 . 
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that this was "because the issue was not fully argued and because of 
the conclusions reached on the substance."51 
The fact that the issue was not fully argued is a problem with the 
nature of this type of appeal, where the court will not necessarily be 
presented with all the facts . This issue is discussed in general terms in 
Part II above. Butler's case illustrates the fact that there is a need in 
some instances to encourage full pleadings at the appeal level. 
Despite lacking the full facts, the Court in this case could have been 
more express in its treatment of the reviewability issue. The judgment 
refers to the fact that the parties agreed that the Courts have the 
power to review determinations of the RSAA for error of law. Given 
this, it seems unusual that, if the judges had serious doubt about the 
availability of review, they were not more open to discussing their 
reasons for this doubt. Clearly the exercise of a power to determine a 
person's freedom to stay in New Zealand is the sort of administrative 
matter which should be reviewable. 52 As the situation was left, there 
is now doubt about the reviewability of the prerogative where there 
had been none before. The Court of Appeal missed an opportunity to 
add further certainty to this area of judicial review. 
Following the brief discussion of whether the RSAA's exercise of power 
was reviewable, Justice Keith comments that it would be helpful if 
Parliament would clarify the issue by passing legislation covering this 
area: 53 
Legislation, such as that enacted in Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom - or in New Zealand in respect of other 
immigration matters - would remove any doubts about 
reviewability and could be expected as well to regulate aspects of 
the courts ' powers, for instance by way of rights of appeal to 
them. 
51 Butler above n 3 , 20 . 
52 An analogy can be drawn here to the reasoning of Lord Justice Taylor in 
Everett's case: above n 46. 
53 Butle r above n 3 , 20 . 
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However, legislation should not be required in every area of law. The 
common law is quite settled on the matter of review of the prerogative 
and provides adequate recourse where a power is alleged to have been 
exercised improperly. 
The Court of Appeal's consideration of Butler's case has unwittingly 
cast doubt on what had until then seemingly been a settled area of 
law. Prerogative powers are reviewable in New Zealand. Parts IV and 
V discuss more contentious areas for judicial review. 
IV REVIEW OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE BODIES: MERCURYv ECNZ 
New Zealand has been undergoing major change in its public sector 
since the mid-1980s as successive Governments have undertaken a 
process of privatisation and corporatisation. A number of state owned, 
public-private, bodies have been set up including SOEs, Crown 
Research Institutes, Regional Health Authorities and Crown Health 
Enterprises. 54 
The majority of these public-private bodies are set up by statute as 
commercial entities aiming for profit. Prior to being privatised their 
functions were administered by government departments. These 
departments were subject to judicial review not least because they fell 
within the scope of the ultra vires rule. In addition, these departments 
clearly exercised "public functions" so, where this basis of allowing 
judicial review was used by the courts, the exercise of public power 
was clearly reviewable in principle. 
The introduction of these public-private bodies has influenced the 
development of judicial review in New Zealand. This section focuses 
on the way in which applications for review of commercial decisions of 
these bodies are being dealt with by the Courts. Commercial decisions 
54 RHAs and CHEs have recently undergone ye t more restruc turing. The
 
RHAs have been combined into one Health Funding Authority and as of 1 
Oc tober 1998 CHEs will once again b e called Hospitals . The "for profit'' 
model has been modified to a d egree. 
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cause the most difficulty in judicial review proceedings. This is 
because the bodies are exercising powers which have previously 
clearly fallen within the realm of 'public function '. In particular it has 
taken (and continues to take) the public a good deal of time to get 
used to the idea of such powers essentially being privatised. Different 
agendas affect the way in which the powers are viewed in each 
instance. 
A The courts' decisions in Mercury 
The Mercury Energy case arose after the Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ) gave twelve months notice of its decision to terminate 
a local supply contract. This decision affected the Auckland Electric 
Power Board (a local supplier) who sought a declaration and injunction 
against ECNZ. The High Court held that the judicial review action 
should be struck out and this decision was appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. 55 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, and held that the 
decision by ECNZ was not amenable to judicial review. The Court of 
Appeal focused on the question of justiciability in relation to SO Es. 
The essence of the Court of Appeal's decision was that ECNZ was a 
corporation incorporated under the Companies Act 1955 and it derived 
its powers to terminate supply contracts from the common law of 
contract, not from statute. This source of power meant the decision 
was not amenable to judicial review. A line of New Zealand cases, 
starting with New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies 
Association Incorporated56 state that the exercise of contractual rights 
are outside the scope of powers derived from statute and as such are 
not able to be challenged in judicial review proceedings under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The Court of Appeal in Mercury 
said that it wa s not possible to isolate particular acts in the conduct of 
the business of the S0Es as the exercise of a statutory power of 
55 Auckland Electric Pow er Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
[ 1 994] 1 NZLR 551 [Auckland Electric]. 
56 [1984] 1 NZLR 699 (CA). 
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decision in terms of the Act.57 This is a prime example showing that 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 no longer provides a good basis 
from which to determine whether or not judicial review should be 
available.SB The source of the power was focused on to too great an 
extent. 
On appeal to the Privy Council59, their Lordships moved away from the 
Court of Appeal's narrow interpretation of statutory power. The 
nature of the power exercised was assessed and it was held that 
judicial review was available in principle6D: 
A state owned enterprise is a public body, its shares are held 
by Ministers who are responsible to the House of 
Representatives and accountable to the electorate. The 
corporation carries on its business in the interests of the 
public. Decisions in the public interest by the corporation, a 
body established by statute, may adversely affect the rights 
and liabilities of private individuals without offering them any 
redress. The Lordships take the view that in these 
circumstances the decisions of the corporation are in 
principle amenable to judicial review both under the Act of 
1972 and under the common law. 
This statement broadened the notion of statutory power to include 
state owned enterprises. However, Mercury61 was not able to establish 
a ground for review. In what has become a well known judicial 
statement, the Privy Council said62: 
It does not seem likely that a decision by a state-owned 
enterprise to enter into or determine a commercial contract to 
57 Auckland Electric above n 55, 558-559. 
58 The Judicature Amendment Act is discussed in more detail in Part II above. 
59 Mercury above n 4. 
60 Mercury above n 4, 388. 
6 1 Mercury Energy Limited is the new name for the Auckland Electric Power 
Board, which was itself corporatised in the early 1990s. 
62 Mercury above n 4, 391. 
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This sentence has been seized upon in subsequent cases. It has been 
viewed as an unequivocal statement that commercial decisions of 
SOEs cannot be subjected to judicial review unless there has been 
fraud, corruption or bad faith. However, this is arguably too broad an 
interpretation of the Privy Council's statement as will be discussed 
below. First however, it will be helpful to look at examples of how the 
statement has been interpreted in subsequent cases. 
B Interpretation of Mercury 
In New Zealand Private Hospitals Association and Others v Northern 
RHA. 63 Blanchard J interpreted the Mercury decision as stating that 
decisions to enter into or determine commercial contracts could never 
be reviewed. The case challenged the development of a policy by the 
RHA to determine the merits of rest homes and their services on a 
competitive basis. The policy aimed to counter the over-supply of rest 
homes in the Northern RHA area. The Private Hospitals Association 
brought an action to review that policy alleging breach of a number of 
administrative law grounds. In his judgment Blanchard J statedM: 
I bear in mind the advice of the Privy Council in Mercury 
Energy Limited that it does not seem likely that a decision by 
a state owned enterprise to enter into a commercial contract 
to supply goods or services will ever be the subject of judicial 
review in the absence of fraud corruption or bad faith. 
Mr Harrison argued that this could be seen as being 
restricted to a comment on an attack based on 
unreasonableness or irrationality. He was arguing that their 
Lordships were saying only that a decision to enter into or 
determine a commercial contract to supply goods or services 
63 (7 December 1994) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 440/94. 
[Private Hospitals]. 
64 Private Hospitals above n 63, 37. 
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that Lord Templeton's words were intended to be of more 
general application. 
32 
Blanchard J declined to find a cause of action challenging the 
unfairness of the process of the RHA. He stated65: 
Here it seems to me that the defendant, in carrying out its 
functions of purchasing health services and disability 
services by means of purchase agreements or otherwise 
(section 33), is not exercising a power conferred by statute as 
it would be, for example, if the statute in question gave an 
express power to enter into contracts of particular kinds and 
laid down criteria and procedures relating to them. 
Here Blanchard J reverted back to the emphasis on assessmg 
reviewability based on whether a statutory power of decision was 
exercised. This method was effectively overturned by the Privy 
Council in Mercury. 
This interpretation of Mercury was also used by McGechan J in 
Gregory v Rangitikei District Council where the judge stated that the 
Privy Council in Mercury had placed "a severe discretionary limitation" 
on any review of commercial decisions. 66 Likewise, in Lawson v 
Housing New Zealand and Others67, Williams J declined to review the 
decision of Housing New Zealand because it was a purely commercial 
decision and there was an absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith. 
These cases show that in a number of cases the interpretation of the 
Privy Council's statement in Mercury has been that purely commercial 
decisions are never reviewable in the absence of fraud, corruption, or 
bad faith. However, a less strict interpretation has been adopted in 
other cases. 
65 Privat.e Hospitals above n 63, 42 . 
66 [1995] 2 NZLR 208,237. 
6 7 [1997] 2 NZLR 474. 
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C Alternative Arguments 
One of the first decisions to consider the Privy Council decision in 
Mercury was Napier City Council v Healthcare Hawkes Bay Ltd, Central 
RHA and Attomey-General68. Healthcare Hawkes Bay's decision to 
establish a regional acute hospital at Hastings and to reduce services 
at Napier was challenged. The Napier City Council applied to have the 
decision set aside and to be given a further opportunity to consult 
before any decision was made. The orders were granted by Ellis J. He 
interpreted the Privy Council in Mercury as having restricted judicial 
review of SOEs only to situations in which the merits of a decision are 
being reviewed. He distinguished Mercury in the following way: 69 
Here the decision goes to the very heart of HCHB 's 
undertaking and has very heavy social and political content. 
Here too it is procedural fairness that is in issue, not the 
merits of the decision. Further, the procedure in question is 
the subject of clear legal guidelines . It is those that are an 
issue not the palpable but unjusticiable elements of "social 
responsibility. 
In Southern Community Laboratories Limited v Healthcare Otago 
Limited70 , Healthcare Otago sought to rely on the Privy Council's 
problematic sentence to support their argument that their actions 
were not reviewable. Eichelbaum CJ struck out the plaintiffs actions 
but introduced the idea of commercial decisions falling along a 
continuum.71 
[i]n relation to a CHE due allowance has to be made for the 
considerations of social responsibility in the interests of the 
community. These however are relative rather than absolute 
68 (15 December 1994) unreported, High Court, Napier Registry, CP29/94, 
[Napier City Councifj. Healthcare Hawkes Bay is a CHE. 
69 Napier City Council above n 68 , 29 . 
7 0 (19 December 1996) , unreported, High Court, Dunedin Registry, CP30/96 
[ Southern Community Laboratories!) . 
11 Southern Community Laboratories above n 70, 16-1 7. 
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In this way, a line can be drawn when assessmg whether or not 
commercial decisions should be reviewable . Clearly it would be 
impractical to have every minor purchase of a body open to review, but 
where a major contract is under consideration, and the outcome of the 
decision will affect a significant section of the public, judicial review 
should be an option. In these cases, the standard of reviews should 
not be made so high that only extreme "unreasonable" acts provide 
grounds for review. Judicial review should be an active remedy. 
Another alternative view was raised by Rodney Harrison, QC as 
counsel for the plaintiffs in the Private Hospitals72 case. The argument 
was rejected by Blanchard J , but is nonetheless a solid approach. As 
noted above, Harrison argued that the Privy Council's statement 
regarding fraud, corruption and bad faith was only intended to apply 
to judicial review actions alleging unreasonableness or irrationality. 
Illegality or procedural impropriety were not intended to be included. 
The argument can be justified in the following way: allegations of 
unreasonableness or irrationality get very close to the merits of the 
decision, and Courts are generally reluctant to judge such matters in 
judicial review actions. For this reason, the Privy Council said that 
allegations of unreasonableness or irrationality will only be allowed 
where there is fraud, corruption or bad faith . Where an SOE has 
acted illegally or has failed to follow required procedural steps it seems 
reasonable that the courts should intervene, just as they will where a 
government body acts in a procedurally unfair manner. 
This alternative approach would avoid the watering down of judicial 
review, at least within the context of public-private bodies. In addition 
to being available in principle, judicial review would also be available 
72 Privat.e Hospitals a bove n 6 3 . 
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ill substance ill some situations where so called "commercial 
decisions" are made. This approach also provides a principled method 
of distinguishing between a review of the process by which a decision 
is made and a review of the merits of that decision. Commercial 
decisions of SOEs and similar bodies have the potential to impact 
heavily on the public interest. For this reason, the procedural aspects 
should be amenable to judicial review more often than where there is 
proved to be fraud, corruption or bad faith. 
The Privy Council ill Mercury quoted extensively from the 
Wednesbury 73 decision before stating that judicial review would be 
unlikely to be available in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad 
faith. 74 Their Lordships did not take the opportunity to develop a set 
of rational principles which would assist future courts to determine 
situations in which judicial review should be available. 
The issue of the reviewability of commercial decisions of public-private 
bodies is likely to continue in the future as more government bodies 
are made into crown entities such as SOEs. In addition, there have 
been moves to sell some of these bodies to the private sector. Despite 
this, the functions of the entities will remain more or less the same, 
meanillg that judicial review should continue to be available where 
there is question about the exercise of a public function . The 
reviewability of decisions made by fully private bodies is discussed in 
the next section. 
V REVIEW OF PRIVATE BODIES: ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
vCAMERON 
This section examilles a third area ill which judicial review 
proceedings have been brought against a body which does not fit 
within the traditional bounds of judicial review. In Cameron75 a non-
73 
74 
75 
Wednesbury Corporation above n 10. 
This approach by the Privy Council was criticised by Michael Taggart in his 
article "Corporatisation, Contracting and the Courts" [1994] PL 351. 
Cameron above n 5 . 
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statutory body was found in principle to be open to judicial review. In 
the event, the Court relied on the Declaratory Judgments Act to give 
appropriate recourse for the applicant, so the discussion of the 
availability of judicial review under the Judicature Amendment Act 
1972 is technically obiter. Despite this, the case is important in that it 
involves review proceedings of a non-statutory body which wields 
considerable public power. Comments made in the judgment give 
some indication of where the Courts may head in the future and the 
case also opens up scope for consideration of the impact of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
This part begins by looking at the facts of Cameron. Following this, the 
Court's decision is assessed and the impact of that decision is 
considered. Finally, the place of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in 
judicial review proceedings is looked at. 
A Facts of Cameron 
In this proceeding the Electoral Commission (Commission) sought 
review m the Court of Appeal of a decision of the Advertising 
Standards Complaints Board (ASCB), through its chief executive, 
Cameron. The ASCB is an unincorporated body constituted under the 
rules of the Advertising Standards Authority Incorporated (ASA) which 
represents organisations of the major industry interest groups. The 
ASA set up the Advertising Codes of Practice and established the 
ASCB to rule on complaints made by reference to the codes. 
The ASA and the ASCB perform very similar functions in the area of 
advertising as does the Broadcasting Standards Authority in relation 
to public broadcasts generally. The Broadcasting Standards Authority 
also promulgates codes to be adhered to. The primary difference 
between the two authorities is that the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority was set up under statute, whereas the ASA and ASCB were 
developed by an industry group. The advertising sector set these 
agencies up in response to a fear that if the industry did not set up 
some form of self regulation the government would do it for them. 
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Cameron is an unusual case 111 that the Crown, on behalf of the 
Commission, was able to argue that the body it was suing should be 
reviewable. Generally the Crown is trying to protect itself from such 
review. The case was brought in response to a decision made by the 
ASCB in regard to a complaint lodged with the ASCB against two 
advertisements published by the Commission. The Commission is a 
Crown entity set up under the Electoral Act 1993 and at that time had 
the principle function of promoting public awareness of the new 
electoral system of Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) . 
In accordance with its mandate, the Commission published 
advertisements designed to convey the major elements of the MMP 
electoral system. The complaint against these advertisements was 
that although they were correct for some scenarios, they did not 
acknowledge the many possible circumstances when they would be 
inaccurate. 
The ASCB found that the advertisements were in breach of the 
Advertising Codes of Practice: they were not truthful presentations 
because they did not refer to the possible exceptions and 
qualifications to the statements of general principle contained in the 
advertisements . The Commission brought an action in judicial review 
to determine whether its advertising, carried out in the exercise of its 
statutory functions, was subject to the jurisdiction of the ASCB. 
B The Court's approach 
This section assesses the Court's approach in deciding Cameron. The 
issue as to whether decisions of the ASCB were reviewable was 
discussed. Following this the grounds of review were considered. In 
the end, the Court did not use the principles of judicial review to 
decide the case in the Commission's favour. 
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1 Reviewability 
In Cameron, the Court addressed the issue of whether decision's of the 
ASCB could be reviewed. There was unanimity between the parties 
that in general they are. The Solicitor-General, on behalf of the 
Commission, argued that the ASA and the ASCB exercise public power 
by imposing collective standard-setting upon the Commission and 
other advertisers, essentially across all major media groups. This 
broad regulatory regime with coercive effect, derived from collective 
practice, was compared with the United Kingdom's Takeovers Panel 
which was held to be exercising public powers and to be amenable to 
judicial review in R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte 
Data.fin. 76 The Court accepted the Solicitor-General's argument but 
also noted the existence of a more direct route to judicial review, via 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
Since the 1977 amendment to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 
judicial review of private bodies has technically been available in New 
Zealand providing the body can be said to have exercised a "statutory 
power" . As outlined in Part II above, section 3 of the Act defines a 
statutory power of decision as including a power or right conferred by 
or under any Act, or by or under the constitution or other instrument 
of incorporation, rules, or bylaws of any body corporate to do a 
number of things. 
This is a fairly broad definition, but in reality, few decisions which are 
not made under legislation have been reviewed. The Courts have only 
found non-statutory bodies to be reviewable where there has been a 
strong public element. Examples of these cases include: Finnigan v 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union77 where the national importance of 
the Union opened it up to review proceedings; Atkinson v New Zealand 
Kennel Club Inc7B where a kennel club was found to be reviewable; and 
76 Dat.afin above n 12 . 
11 [1985] NZLR 159. 
78 (15 April 1983) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, A 609/81. 
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Beagle v Petone Workingmen's Club and Literary Institute 79 where 
review proceedings were launched against a workingmen's club. 
In Cameron, the Court found that the decisions made by the ASCB 
under the Advertising Codes of Practice fell within the definition of 
"statutory power of decision". There was little doubt that the ASCB's 
functions were of a public nature and this was evidenced by the fact 
that the regulatory role of the ASCB has statutory recognition in the 
Broadcasting Act 1989. The Court noted that:Bo 
The significance of this statutory recognition of the board is to 
confirm, if that is necessary, that the board has a role of a public 
nature in regulating advertising equivalent in part to that of the 
statutory Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
The decisions of the ASCB were held to be reviewable in principle. The 
Court commented that: 81 
It would be a strange result indeed if it were held that decisions 
of the board were not amenable to review while decisions of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, exerc1smg cognate 
jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act plainly are reviewable. 
2 The grounds of review 
After determining the issue of reviewability, the Court of Appeal 
considered the grounds upon which it would be appropriate to allow 
judicial review. (This was despite the fact judicial review was not used 
in the end.) The Court noted that:82 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Decisions of unincorporated bodies exercising public regulatory 
functions may not easily fall for examination on conventional 
grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 
(31 May 1985) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, A 325 / 82. 
Cameron above n 5, 424 . 
Cameron above n 5 , 429 . 
Cameron above n 5 , 430 . 
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The Court said that in a case such as this it would be prepared to 
apply a "more flexible approach" than is traditional in judicial review. 
That was because the ASCB was a non-statutory body which 
nevertheless had claimed its own jurisdiction to wield wide public 
powers. In particular, the Court was prepared to relax the 
Wednesbury threshold of unreasonableness and invoke Lord 
Donaldson MR's "innominate" ground from R v Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc. 83 It was noted that:84 
... the legitimacy of the exercise of the powers should be 
scrutinised not narrowly by reference to that jurisdiction but 
rather more broadly as indicated by Lord Donaladson in the 
Guinness case. For instance, it would seem entirely appropriate 
in such circumstances to have regard to any encroachment 
upon statutory functions and powers conferred on public 
authorities and to apply a somewhat lower standard of 
reasonableness than "irrationality'' in the strict sense. 
This last sentence shows that it was material that this case involved a 
non-statutory body interfering with a statutory body. The Court 
said:85 
The line may not be easy to draw in particular instances. But 
the standing and responsibilities of the commission justify a 
conservative approach to interference with its func tions . 
It remains to be seen whether this lower standard of reasonableness 
will be applied in future decisions involving review of non-statutory 
bodies who have exercised power over other non-statutory bodies. 
This issue is discussed below in regard to the impact of the decision. 
83 [1990] 1 QB 14 6 , 159- 160. 
84 Cameron above n 5 , 433. 
85 Cameron above n 5 , 434 . 
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3 The decision 
It appears the Solicitor-General was concerned to present the case in 
a judicial review context to ensure a clear distinction between the 
right of any individual publisher to reject advertisements in the 
exercise of freedom of expression (which he did not wish to encroach 
upon) , and the collective exercise of industry regulation effectively to 
prevent dissemination of particular advertisements so as to impede 
the exercise by the Commission of its statutory functions. 86 This 
distinction is made clear if the focus is on the ASCB's powers and the 
exercise of those powers in relation to the Commission. 
However, in the end, judicial review was not used to decide the case in 
the Commission's favour. Instead, the Court issued a declaration, 
under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, that the board has no 
authority to make rulings in relation to advertisements of the 
commission published in the exercise of its statutory public awareness 
functions . The next section assesses the impact of that decision and, 
in particular, the Court 's obiter comments about the reviewability of 
the ASCB . 
C Impact of the decision 
Cameron gives a strong indication of where the Court is likely to head 
in deciding future cases where judicial review proceedings are brought 
against non-statutory bodies. It is an emphatic, unanimous decision 
of a five-judge Court of Appeal. In the end, because the Court relied 
on the Declaratory Judgments Act in making its final decision, its 
comments on the reviewability of the ASCB were obiter. However, the 
Court of Appeal has endorsed its comments in Cameron in Waitakere 
City Council v LovelockB7 and the case seems likely to hold 
considerable sway as a precedent in future judicial review actions 
involving non-statutory bodies. 
86 Cameron above n 5 , 430. 
87 [1 997] 2 NZLR 385, 403, 420 [Waitakere]. 
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1 Successful review in subsequent cases? 
The facts of Cameron were umque m that the case involved a non-
statutory body making a decision which adversely affected a statutory 
body. The standing of the Commission was material:88 
... the standing and responsibilities of the commission justify a 
conservative approach to interference with its functions. They 
are, after all, at the heart of our democratic system. 
More commonly, bodies such as the ASCB will be subject to judicial 
review proceedings where they have made decisions affecting other 
private bodies. As an example, consider corporate advertisers. The 
majority of these advertisers could not claim to hold a vital democratic 
status, and as such may not be able to invoke the lower standard of 
reasonableness applied in the Commission's case. However, there is 
an alternative view. Thomas J reflecting on Cameron in Waitakere City 
Council v Lovelock interpreted the reasoning as follows: 89 
. .. this Court adopted a different standard of reasonableness m 
[Cameron] but that adjustment resulted from the fact that the 
body which had allegedly exceeded its powers was a non-
statutory body exercising public power and not from the gravity of 
the decision in issue. (emphasis added) 
This indicates that the reasonmg m Cameron was simply that the 
ASCB was a private body which claimed its own right to wield 
significant public power and set its own jurisdiction and, as such, it 
should be scrutinised closely. Given this, it seems likely that future 
cases involving the judicial review of non-statutory bodies will allow 
review even where the plaintiff is a private body. 
88 Cameron above n 5, 434. 
89 Waitakere above n 87, 41 9 . 
72224 WGN WGN2098 
43 
2 Private bodies' rule-making 
The consequence of finding a body such as the ASCB reviewable in 
principle opens up issues about the flexibility of the rules promulgated 
by such bodies. The ASCB enforces Codes set by the ASA but that 
body is not subject to any real restrictions in its setting of those rules. 
If judicial review proceedings find that a decision has been made by 
the body in an inappropriate way, there is nothing to stop the body 
changing the rules or its procedure to avoid the impact of the Court's 
decision . In this sense, judicial review is a somewhat weak form of 
redress in this context. 
Of course, where judicial review of a statutory body finds that body 
liable, the legislature can certainly legislate to avoid the "problem". 
The difference is that the legislature is subject to many more checks 
on its powers than are private bodies. For example, the members of 
Parliament responsible for changing the laws are open to direct 
challenge from opposition members. In addition, the select committee 
process ensures that proposed legislation is analysed by a range of 
members and public submissions are received. If regulations are 
considered to be unreasonable they may be ref erred to the Regulations 
Review Committee. Government officials are subject to scrutiny by the 
ombudsmen and m most situations must comply with the 
requirements of the Official Information Act 1982 , the Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Up until now, 
none of these checks have been imposed on private bodies even if they 
are exercising public power. However, there may be scope under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to control some actions of private 
bodies. This is discussed in the next section. 
D The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
Since its introduction in 1990 the New Zealand Bill of Rights has 
primarily been used in criminal and blood alcohol cases9o, evidential 
90 The most well known case is Noort v Ministry of Transport [1992] 1 NZLR 
743; 
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matters91 and matters of statutory interpretation.92 It has been 
commented that the Bill has not had the impact that was expected93 
and there is considerable untapped potential. Taggart notes that if we 
follow the Canadian Charter experience the next area likely to be 
targeted by Bill of Rights arguments is administrative law.94 
1 Application 
The Bill of Rights has a different focus to administrative law, and it is 
applied differently. In simple terms, where the Bill of Rights is used, 
the starting point is the right allegedly infringed by the exercise of 
discretionary power by a public authority. Following this, there is an 
mqurry into whether the right has been reasonably or justifiably 
limited. If it has not, then the public authority must decide in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights. The decision-maker is prevented 
from exercising the discretionary power in a way that infringes the Bill 
of Rights. In comparison, there is a hierarchy of considerations m 
administrative law's control of discretionary power. 
However, a precondition of using the Bill of Rights is that the decision-
maker falls within the ambit of the Act. Section 3 is the application 
section and reads as follows : 
3. Application-
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial 
branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
91 For example, R v Kijiri [1992] 2 NZLR 8 ; and R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 
257. 
92 See Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1 991] 1 NZLR 439 . 
93 Philip Joseph, 'Constitutional Review Now' [1 988] NZLRev 85, 119. 
94 Michael Taggart -"Tugging on Superman's Cape: Lessons from experience
 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" [1998] PL 266, 275 
[Superman]. 
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Where a body can be fitted into the application section, and a plaintiff 
has had an actionable right breached by the responsible body, there is 
potential to use the Bill of Right as the basis of a ground of judicial 
review. This could be used alone or brought along with other grounds 
such as procedural unfairness, unreasonableness or illegality. The 
issue therefore, is how far the application of the Bill of Rights reaches. 
The Court in Cameron held that the ASCB exercised a public function. 
On this basis there is room to include this sort of body within section 
3(b) of the application section. In the case of the ASCB, the fact that 
its powers are recognised in the Broadcasting Act 1956 may be 
sufficient to cover the requirement that the body's powers or duties be 
conferred or imposed pursuant to law. Taking this further, it may be 
possible to argue that incorporated bodies' powers or duties are 
conferred or imposed pursuant to the companies legislation. This 
interpretation would significantly broaden the application of the Bill of 
Rights. It would go some way toward ensuring that bodies wielding 
public powers do not abuse them, and it would make available a 
remedy which sounds in damages. 95 
When looking for guidance as to the interpretation of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act it is common to look at the Canadian experience in 
part because the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
heavily leaned upon in the drafting of New Zealand's Bill of Rights. 
The Charter's application section is narrower than the New Zealand's 
version as it only applies to the Federal Parliament and government, 
and the provincial legislatures and governments. However, the 
Canadian Courts have adopted an expansive approach to the 
95 Since Baigent's case it has been clear that damages for breaches of the Bill 
of Rights will be available in some situations (Simpson v Attorney-General 
[1994] 3 NZLR 667) . 
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Charter's application. A "control test" has been applied by the 
Canadian Courts. Where it is found that a body exercises significant 
control over an area of public power or a right set out in the Charter, 
the body is often found to be subject to the Charter. For example, 
adjudicative tribunals and municipal government have been found 
subject to the Charter% and in the case of Eldridge v Attorney General 
of British Columbia97, a Hospital Board (which was not set up directly 
under statute) was found to be reviewable under the Canadian 
Charter. It seems therefore, that there is some precedent for 
extending the interpretation of New Zealand's Bill of Rights so it 
applies to more bodies which exercise public power. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 may extend even further 
where a body fits within section 3(a). There is a strong argument that 
every act performed by such a body is covered by the Bill of Rights, 
irrespective of whether it is a public act or a private transaction. If 
this is the case, the Act extends the potential grounds of review where 
a "government" power is in issue. Employment contracts between an 
individual and a government body, would possibly be open to 
challenge under the Bill of Rights despite the fact that this area of law 
is usually considered to be private .98 
3 Specific breaches of the Bill of Rights 
If private bodies exercising public power can fit within the ambit of the 
Bill of Rights there are a number of rights set out in Part II of the Act 
which could potentially be breached by such a body. For example, the 
ASCB could be found to have breached the section 14 right to freedom 
of expression if it unreasonably stopped advertisers broadcasting. 
This would open up considerable scope for advertisers to check the 
ASCB's power to censor. Another source of redress may be section 27 
which protects the right to natural justice and holds considerable 
96 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law 
Book Company, Sydney, 1993), 854. 
97 (1995) 125 DLR (4th) 323; (1997) 3 BHRC. 
98 A full analysis of this possible extension to the law of judic ial review 1
s 
beyond the s cope of this paper . 
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potential for decisions of bodies to be reviewed, especially where due 
process has not been followed. 
There is scope for the Bill of Rights to develop the law in some areas. 
Shortly after its introduction the prima facie rule excluding evidence 
obtained in breach of the Bill of Rights was embraced by the courts. 99 
A similar development could come about in the area of judicial review 
by allowing redress where a private body is exercising public power. 
Of course there is the danger that the law could be pushed too far in 
one direction. 100 However, the legislature could check such extremes 
by amending the law if it is deemed to be causing a significant 
problem. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Judicial review remams an important form of redress where a 
decision-maker in a position of public power exercises its power in a 
way that negatively affects an individual or organisation. However, the 
type of bodies open to judicial review has changed significantly in 
recent years. The law has moved away from requiring strict adherence 
to the ultra vires rule in the sense that the source of the power is the 
first consideration, toward a greater focus on the function and nature 
of the power exercised by the decision-maker. This development has 
not been fully embraced by the New Zealand courts, in part because of 
the structure of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. However, the 
increased corporatisation and privatisation of previously government 
owned entities has sped up the process of change. This is particularly 
seen in the decisions in Mercury and Cameron. 
99 Superman above n 94, 274. 
100 It is arguable that this happened with the evidence rules: relative 
technicalities were stopping prosecution of otherwise clearly guilty parties. 
Recently there has been a move away from such extreme use of the Act. 
This is noted by Taggart in Superman above n 94, 275. 
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A number of theories regarding the justification for judicial review 
have been put forward. Some advocate a move away from the ultra 
vires rule while others believe that doctrine must remain at the core of 
the cause of action. It seems clear that there has been a shift in the 
basis of judicial review so the task now is to ensure the developments 
proceed in a principled way so as to encourage a useful working tool 
which can effectively check abuse of power. 
Opening judicial review to a broader range of bodies has led to the 
grounds of judicial review being watered down in some instances. 
Different standards of unreasonableness have been held to apply 
depending on the nature of the power exercised. This approach has 
advantages and disadvantages. It poses some problems when trying 
to ascertain certainty for future cases but allows greater flexibility in a 
complex field. Judicial review cases must be determined on their 
unique facts . 
In New Zealand the introduction of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 has 
brought with it potentially new grounds for judicial review. This scope 
is yet to be tested but it seems probable that it will be used in future 
as a check on public power. It is an attractive option given that 
damages are sometimes available if a breach is found. This is one way 
in which judicial review will continue to develop as further cases come 
before the courts. The move away from the doctrine of ultra vires is 
but part of judicial review's continuing evolution. If judicial review is 
to remain useful, this development must continue. 
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